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Antitrust Changeup: How a Single
Antitrust Reform Could Be A Home
Run for Minor League Baseball Players
Jeremy Ulm*
ABSTRACT
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to protect competition in the marketplace. Federal antitrust law has
developed to prevent businesses from exerting unfair power on
their employees and customers. Specifically, the Sherman Act
prevents competitors from reaching unreasonable agreements
amongst themselves and from monopolizing markets. However,
not all industries have these protections.
Historically, federal antitrust law has not governed the “Business of Baseball.” The Supreme Court had the opportunity to
apply antitrust law to baseball in Federal Baseball Club, Incorporated v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs; however, the Court held that the Business of Baseball was not
interstate commerce and thus not subject to federal antitrust law.
The Supreme Court upheld this stance twice more in Toolson v.
N.Y. Yankees, Incorporated and Flood v. Kuhn. Further, the Supreme Court held that, if baseball was to become subject to antitrust law, Congress must be the party to enact such a change. In
1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act (“Flood Act”). The
Flood Act applied antitrust law to certain aspects of baseball
while explicitly not including other aspects, such as the employment of minor league baseball players.
This Comment argues that Congress should act again and
pass legislation to apply federal antitrust law to minor league
baseball. This Comment will analyze the low wages of minor
leaguers and the impact that MLB’s antitrust law immunity has
on those conditions. Further, this Comment argues that the rule
of reason is the proper test for courts to apply to cases brought
by minor leaguers. While this Comment does not predict the
outcome of such cases, it argues that the true value of the appli* J.D. Candidate, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson Law, 2021. I would
like to thank my dad for giving me a love for baseball and my mom for giving me a
love for writing. Without the two of you, none of this would be possible.

227

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-1\DIK106.txt

228

unknown

Seq: 2

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

28-SEP-20

14:24

[Vol. 125:227

cation of antitrust law is the ability for minor leaguers to bring
suits at all.
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INTRODUCTION

“How can you not be romantic about baseball?”1 Brad Pitt’s
line from the movie Moneyball summarizes how many people feel
about America’s Pastime.2 It is a sport that captures its audience
through a series of timeless moments that are remembered for decades and passed down as folklore for generations. Among the
thousands of memorable moments are Jackie Robinson breaking
the color barrier,3 the “shot heard round the world,”4 and the home
run chase between Sosa and McGwire.5 Those memories are just
the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the moments that have made
baseball the game that it is today.
However, in the front office, the game loses its romanticism.
Over the past three decades, professional baseball has grown financially at an incredible rate,6 and player salaries have skyrocketed.7
In 2019, Los Angeles Angels center fielder Mike Trout signed the
largest contract in the history of North American sports, totaling
almost $430 million over 12 years.8 While players and fans may
romanticize the high salaries, they remain just a dream for many
who pursue a career in baseball.
Players who make it to “The Show” earn a sizeable income,
whether they are on massive contracts like Trout, or even just earn
the league minimum.9 However, minor league players (“minor
leaguers”) play for the hope of future financial success and a love of
the game, not because they immediately see impressive income.10
1. MONEYBALL (Columbia Pictures 2011).
2. See, e.g., Micah Chen, America’s Pastime: 20 Reasons Why Baseball Will
Always Hail over Football, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 25, 2011), http://bit.ly/
3bTGIGR [https://perma.cc/59PU-7M9U].
3. See, e.g., Biography, JACKIE ROBINSON, http://bit.ly/2v7tKoi [https://
perma.cc/66EP-M6P9] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
4. See, e.g., The Story Behind the Shot Heard Round the World, NPR (Oct. 3,
2006), n.pr/2PefjW8 [https://perma.cc/87TA-CPBR].
5. See, e.g., Grant Brisbee, The Misremembering of McGwire-Sosa, SBNATION (Sept. 5, 2018), http://bit.ly/2wFkUyv [https://perma.cc/R79D-D654].
6. See Brown, infra note 155 (noting the increase in MLB annual revenue
from $1.2 billion in 1992 to $10.7 billion in 2019).
7. See, e.g., Michael Haupert, MLB’s Annual Salary Leaders Since 1874, SOCIETY FOR AMERICAN BASEBALL RESEARCH, http://bit.ly/2ulOWGF [https://
perma.cc/445U-K249] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) (noting the increase in highest
player salary from $6.1 million in 1992 to $38.3 million in 2019).
8. See, e.g., Tyler Kepner & Kevin Draper, Mike Trout Received a Huge Payday. But Others Still Dwarf Him, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://
nyti.ms/2HMgbgL [https://perma.cc/MU83-6J9X].
9. See, e.g., MLB Minimum Salary Rises $8,500 to $563,500 Next Season, USA
TODAY (Nov. 13, 2019), http://bit.ly/39X18gm [https://perma.cc/KZ8V-YN6F] (last
visited Feb. 22, 2020).
10. Infra Part III.A.
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Minor leaguers sign Uniform Player Contracts (“UPCs”) regardless
of which of the 30 Major League Baseball (MLB) franchises drafts
them.11 UPCs drastically reduce the bargaining power of minor
leaguers and are arguably anticompetitive because they allow independently-owned franchises to act in unison rather than creating an
open market for players.12 Further, these UPCs may be the type of
agreements that federal antitrust law forbids.13
Antitrust law and baseball have a long and interesting relationship.14 For the purposes of this Comment, the relevant areas of antitrust law include monopolization, horizontal agreements by
competitors, and agreements by unions, all of which arise from the
same principal of economic competition.15 Currently, most of
MLB’s actions are protected from antitrust scrutiny, allowing the 30
member franchises to use tools like the UPCs.16 This Comment will
show the need for the application of antitrust law to the employment of minor leaguers.17 This Comment will do so by analyzing
the financial and contractual position of minor leaguers, as well as
the proper tests to be applied under federal antitrust law.18 This
Comment will also explain why Congress, rather than the judicial
system, must be the body that brings about these changes.19
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Basic Applicable Principles and Purposes of Federal Antitrust
Law
The underlying purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act20 and
other federal antitrust laws is the protection of economic competition in trade.21 This purpose arises from the premise that competition leads to the best economic, political, and social outcomes.22
11. Infra Part III.A.
12. Infra note 126 and accompanying text.
13. Infra Part III.B.
14. Infra Parts II.B.–C.
15. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2018).
16. Infra Parts II.B.–C.
17. Infra Part III.A.
18. Infra Parts III.A, III.B.3.
19. Infra Parts II.B., III.B.1.
20. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).
21. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman
Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”).
22. Id. (“[U]nrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
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The Act’s presumption in favor of economic competition affects
every area of federal antitrust law.23
1. Sherman Act § 1 and the Prohibition of Agreements Amongst
Competitors
The plain text of Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns any
“contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . .”24 The Supreme Court has not strictly
followed this prohibition, instead holding that only “unreasonable”
restraints of trade are illegal.25 This distinction between reasonable
and unreasonable restraints is the “Rule of Reason.”26 As the purpose of the Sherman Act is to preserve competition, the Supreme
Court has held entire categories of agreements that foreclose competition, such as price-fixing agreements, to be per se illegal.27
Sports leagues where multiple competitors join as a single entity offer an interesting variation on this issue. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission
v. National Football League28 held that the individual franchises
that compose the National Football League (NFL) are independent
legal entities in competition with each other, for analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.29 The court based this decision on three
points of analysis.30 First, if the court allowed the NFL to act as a
single entity, then it would be completely free from Section 1 scrutiny.31 This result would contradict how various courts previously
treated the NFL.32 Competitors cannot evade antitrust scrutiny by
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.”).
23. See id. (“But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”).
24. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019).
25. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (“[I]t was
intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common law
. . . was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether in
a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which
the statute provided.”).
26. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687
(1978) (citing Standard Oil as the source of the Rule of Reason).
27. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“The
aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of
one form of competition.”).
28. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir. 1984).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1388.
32. Id. (citing various cases that contradict with the contention that the NFL
should be treated as a single entity); see, e.g., Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543
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forming together into a single venture while retaining their legally
separate identities.33 Second, the necessity of NFL teams’ cooperation, as a means to carry out their business as a league, does not
prevent antitrust scrutiny, although it may bar a finding of per se
illegality.34 Again, failing to apply antitrust principles would result
in contrary treatment of both the NFL and other highly cooperative
industries.35 Lastly, the court reasoned that the NFL based its argument on a flawed premise about the relationship between the
league and its member teams.36 While the NFL distributes a large
share of its profits evenly amongst its member teams, independent
owners operate the organizations.37 As independent competitors,
NFL teams engage in the very types of economic competition that
the antitrust laws exist to preserve.38
The U.S. Supreme Court took the analysis of the relationship
between sports leagues and antitrust law further in American Needle, Incorporated v. National Football League.39 The Court held
that the relevant question is not whether courts should consider the
NFL and similar leagues as single entities but rather whether the
NFL is a group of “separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests.”40 This inquiry required the court to examine
whether the teams had actual economic competition between them,
even though they formed a single legal entity in the form of a
league.41 This holding does not mean that sports teams are unable
to form leagues to cooperate with each other, as such a decision
would undermine the very existence of leagues like the NFL and
F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (allowing the NFL to coordinate as necessary for the
league to carry out its business of putting on football games).
33. See id. at 1389 (“‘Nor do we find any support . . . for the proposition that
agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress competition among themselves and others can be justified by labeling the project a ‘joint
venture.’ Perhaps every agreement and combination to restrain trade could be so
labeled.’”) (quoting Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951)).
34. Id.
35. Id. [part from L.A. Mem’l that supports this, referencing Sealy] (citing
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 356–57 (1967)).
36. Id. at 1389 (“Finally, the district court considered the argument to be
based upon the false premise that the individual NFL ‘clubs are not separate business entities whose products have an independent value.’”).
37. Id. at 1390.
38. Id. (“NFL clubs . . . compete with one another off the field as well as on to
acquire players, coaches, and management personnel. In certain areas of the country where two teams operate in close proximity, there is also competition for fan
support, local television and local radio revenues, and media space.”).
39. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
40. Id. at 195.
41. Id. at 196.
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MLB.42 Rather, the Rule of Reason subjects any member teams’
agreements to antitrust scrutiny if those agreements involve the
dealignment of the economic interests of the teams acting as a unit
and the interests of the teams acting as economic competitors.43
2. Sherman Act § 2 and the Prohibition of Monopolization
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits any person or organization from monopolizing an economic market.44 However, the Sherman Act does not outlaw monopolies that arise naturally.45 The
Supreme Court established a two-element test for a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.46 This test requires a plaintiff to
show that the potential monopolist both has possession of monopoly power in a given economic market and took steps towards willful acquisition or maintenance of that power.47 Monopoly power
that arises from a “superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident” is not a violation of Section 2.48 When an organization
has monopoly power in a market, the organization does not have to
exercise its economic power over pricing to violate Section 2.49 Monopolistic conduct is precisely the type of activity that the Sherman
Act attempts to prevent, as it eliminates competition by its very
nature.50
One concern that often arises under Section 2 is vertical integration.51 Vertical integration is when an organization itself per42. See id. at 204.
43. Id. at 203 (“When ‘restraints on competition are essential if the product is
to be available at all,’ per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the
restraint must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.”).
44. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (“Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d
Cir. 1945) (stating that holding a monopoly is legal while monopolization is the
prohibited conduct). A monopoly is an organization’s control over an economic
market. Id. Monopolization is using anticompetitive means to establish that control. Id.
46. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 571.
49. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 427 (“[I]t is no excuse for ‘monopolizing’ a
market that the monopoly has not been used to extract from the consumer more
than a ‘fair’ profit.”).
50. Id. at 429 (“Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly
assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own
sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which
can effectively compete with each other.”).
51. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
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forms multiple stages of production rather than having an outside
competitor assist with each stage.52 While vertical integration alone
does not create an antitrust violation, there are potential pitfalls.53
When a monopolist vertically integrates into a second market, the
monopolist could be creating a second monopoly.54 This second
monopoly does not typically result in a final price increase in a
downstream market, provided the monopolist is already charging
monopoly prices.55 A secondary monopoly may, however, allow a
monopolist to suppress prices in the downstream market below the
competitive level and to increase the original monopoly’s profit
margins.56 The relationship between Major and Minor League
Baseball (“MiLB”) may fit the model of vertically integrated monopolies in two separate markets, opening the door for potential
antitrust scrutiny.57 The current relationship between the Business
of Baseball and antitrust law may bar such an inquiry, however.58
3. Antitrust Law and Union Bargaining
The activities and agreements that unions and other labor organizations reach receive special treatment in antitrust law, both by
statute and the common law.59 The Clayton Act specifically carves
out an exemption in antitrust law for the formation and operation
of labor unions.60 This exemption arises from the premise that society should protect human labor and not treat it as a mere economic
52. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
CASES 450 (7th ed. 2013) (providing an example of vertical integration in a
hypothetical manufacturing context).
53. Id. at 451 (providing illustration of a harmless and unavoidable instance of
vertical integration).
54. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973)
(finding the creation of a secondary monopoly by refusing to allow the entrance of
competitors in the downstream electric power distribution market).
55. AREEDA, ET AL., supra note 52, at 451.
56. Id. (providing an illustration of a change in distribution of profit margins
between the original and secondary monopoly markets for aluminum pipe and ingot, respectively).
57. See Teams by MLB Affiliation, MILB, http://bit.ly/mlbteams [https://
perma.cc/95NC-ZSEY] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (showing the franchise structure
between MLB and MiLB franchises).
58. See Parts II.B., II.C.
59. Infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
60. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2019) (“Nothing contained in the antitrust
laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . . or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof.”).
AND
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good or commodity.61 As one may expect, however, this exemption
is not an absolute protection for all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies into which a labor union may enter.62
One important area to which the exemption does not extend is
when a union acts in combination with a non-union organization.63
While certain agreements to which a union is a party may be permissible under federal antitrust law, the addition of a business into
such an agreement may subject the combination to antitrust scrutiny.64 If a business’s actions would violate the Sherman Act, those
same actions are illegal if a union and business carry out a similar
action while acting in combination.65
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded upon
the question of when union activities trigger antitrust scrutiny in
Mackey v. National Football League.66 Labor law may supersede
antitrust law where the only restraint of trade arises from an agreement between the parties of a collective bargaining agreement.67
Additionally, this preemption applies to only the subjects of
mandatory collective bargaining.68 Lastly, agreements can override
antitrust law only when the agreement between parties arises from
“bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.”69 These distinctions are of
great importance when analyzing the relationship between minor
leaguers, MLB, and the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA).

61. Id. (“The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce.”).
62. See, e.g., Int’l Org., United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal &
Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839, 843 (4th Cir. 1927) (clarifying that, while a labor union’s
ordinary function is not a violation of the Sherman Act, acts that are outside of
legitimate union objectives are still subject to antitrust scrutiny).
63. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
325 U.S. 797, 810 (1945).
64. Id. at 811.
65. Id. (“We know that Congress feared the concentrated power of business
organizations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw business monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and
such participation is a violation of the Act.”).
66. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
67. Id.
68. Id.; W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Subjects of mandatory collective bargaining under Federal Labor Relations Act, 12 A.L.R.2d 265 (explaining areas where
the Federal Labor Relations Act requires employers to use collective bargaining).
69. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
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B. Judicial History of the “Business of Baseball” Exemption to
Federal Antitrust Law
In 1922, the Supreme Court established an exemption to federal antitrust law for the “Business of Baseball” in Federal Baseball
Club, Incorporated v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.70 Relying on the narrow interpretation of the Commerce
Clause71 in effect at that time, the Court held that the Business of
Baseball was not interstate commerce and thus was not subject to
federal antitrust law.72 The Court reached this conclusion by
strictly defining the business as putting on individual baseball
games, which by definition could not occur “among the several
States.”73 Teams and players came from different states to compete
in these games, but this fact was not sufficient to meet the definition
of interstate commerce.74 This decision established the nearly century-long “Business of Baseball” exemption.75
Thirty years after Federal Baseball Club, Incorporated v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the Supreme Court
upheld the exemption by issuing a one-paragraph per curium opinion in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.76 Much like Jose Altuve,77 Toolson managed to make up for what it lacked in size with
a lasting impact on the game, for better or worse.78 The Court took
this opportunity to assign the role of subjecting the Business of
Baseball to federal antitrust law to Congress.79 Congress previously
left baseball alone to develop as a market under the assumption
that antitrust did not apply to the sport, leading the Court to believe that Congress was indeed the appropriate entity to change the
relationship.80
70. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 208–209 (1922).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72. Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. 200.
73. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
74. Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 208–09 (“But the fact that in order to give
the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and must
arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change the character of the
business.”).
75. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
76. Id.
77. Jose Altuve Player Profile, ESPN, http://bit.ly/JoseAltuveStats (last visited
Nov. 12, 2019) (listing Jose Altuve’s height as 5’6”).
78. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
79. Id. (“Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit
to bring such business under these laws by legislation having prospective effect.”).
80. Id. (“We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.”).
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The third strike for those seeking the application of antitrust
law to the Business of Baseball came 20 years later when the Court
decided Flood v. Kuhn.81 In Flood, the Court clarified that, under a
more modern and less restrictive view, baseball was clearly a business that took part in interstate commerce.82 The Court clarified
that other sports leagues were also interstate commerce and were
subject to antitrust law.83 The Court did not, however, see fit to
depart from the holdings of Fed. Baseball Club and Toolson.84
Doubling down on past reasoning, the Court held once again that
Congress was the appropriate authority to alter the interplay of
baseball and antitrust.85
Prior to Flood, Congress tried and failed multiple times to create legislation regarding the exemption, and the Supreme Court
viewed this “positive inaction” as the legislature’s intent, or lack
thereof, to apply antitrust law to baseball.86 Additionally, the
Court expressed concern about retroactivity issues that could arise
if the Court overturned Federal Baseball Club.87 Due to the forward-looking nature of legislation, Congressional action would not
create the same concerns.88 The Court loaded the bases for Congress to step up to the plate and settle the issue.
C.

Passage and Treatment of the Curt Flood Act

Twenty-five years later, Congress passed the Flood Act, implementing the legislation the Supreme Court proposed in Toolson
and Flood.89 The Flood Act amended the Clayton Act, creating a
new subsection titled “Application of the antitrust laws to professional major league baseball.”90 The Flood Act appeared on its
face to allow courts to hear cases on a broad variety of antitrust
issues surrounding the modern Business of Baseball that the Busi81. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
82. Id. at 282.
83. Id. at 282–83.
84. Id. (“With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to baseball.”).
85. Id. at 285 (“And what the Court said in Federal Baseball in 1922 and what
it said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if any is indicated,
is for congressional, and not judicial, action.”).
86. Id. at 283.
87. Id.
88. Id. (“The Court . . . has voiced a preference that if any change is to be
made, it come by legislative action that, by its nature, is only prospective in
operation.”).
89. Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2018).
90. Id.
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ness of Baseball exemption previously prevented them from assessing.91 In reality, the specific language of the Flood Act showed just
how limited the revocation of the exemption was and how rarely
courts were willing to subject the Business of Baseball to antitrust
scrutiny.92
1. Inclusions and Omissions Within the Flood Act
The Flood Act subjects “the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional major
league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league
level” to scrutiny under federal antitrust law where such conduct
would not have been previously up for review.93 This extension of
antitrust law is valid only “to the same extent . . . [as] persons in any
other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.”94
Courts give more leniency to cooperative agreements that are necessary to carry out the business of a sports league.95 Additionally,
while normally the government or any injured party can bring an
antitrust action,96 the Flood Act gives only MLB players standing to
sue for an antitrust violation.97
The Flood Act has far from eliminated the Business of Baseball exemption from federal antitrust law.98 Only the specific
agreements involving MLB players are subject to antitrust scrutiny,
while all other facets of the business remain exempt.99 The Flood
Act provides a non-exhaustive list of exempt agreements.100 This
list includes agreements with umpires and agreements relating to
franchise expansion, franchise relocation, and most important for
the purpose of this Comment, minor league baseball.101 Not only
does conduct “affecting employment to play baseball at the minor
league level” remain free from antitrust scrutiny, but the reserve
91. See, e.g., Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir.
1978) (denying plaintiff’s claim that MLB violated antitrust law by vetoing certain
trades between member teams due to the Business of Baseball exemption).
92. Infra Part II.C.2.
93. Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2018).
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 29–33, 35, 37–44 and accompanying text.
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States . . . .”); id. §§ 15(a), 15(c).
97. Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(c) (2018).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 26b(a).
100. Id. § 26b(b).
101. Id.
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clause102 for minor leaguers and the relationship between Major
and Minor League Baseball are also still exempt.103 Further, the
Flood Act explicitly states that Congress does not extend standing
to sue under the Flood Act to minor leaguers.104
While the plain text of the Flood Act removed only a narrow
portion of the Business of Baseball exemption, in the two decades
since Congress passed the Flood Act, plaintiffs have initiated a variety of suits seeking antitrust scrutiny in areas of the Business of
Baseball other than the “conduct, acts, practices, or agreements . . .
directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball players.”105
2. Judicial Treatment of the Business of Baseball After the Flood
Act
Since the passage of the Flood Act, plaintiffs have brought
multiple cases seeking the courts’ application of antitrust law to various aspects of the Business of Baseball and questioning the Flood
Act’s scope and impact.106
a.

Minor League Players’ Antitrust Claims

In 2015, a group of former minor league baseball players
brought a class action suit on behalf of thousands of minor leaguers,
alleging violations of both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman
Act by MLB and its 30 member franchises.107 The complaint alleged that the MLB franchises “willfully acquired and maintained
monopoly power” over the “market for minor league men’s profes102. Reserve Clause, BASEBALL REFERENCE, http://bit.ly/2GnQsdQ [https://
perma.cc/C54T-958S] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (explaining the function and history of the reserve clause). The reserve clause is a concept in baseball where a
player would be bound to a given team for longer than the length of the individual
contracts he signed. Id. Free agency replaced the reserve clause in MLB after an
arbiter held that the length of the reserve clause was not explicitly stated within
MLB’s player contracts. Id. Minor leaguers currently lack union representation
and the power to compel arbitration with MiLB or MLB. See Delcos, infra note
157.
103. Reserve Clause, supra note 102.
104. Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(c) (2018).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir. 2017) (questioning the applicability of federal antitrust law to minor league baseball); City of San
José v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW, 2013 WL 5609346, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013), aff’d by City of San José v. Office of the Comm’r of
Baseball, 776 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2015) (questioning the applicability of federal antitrust law to MLB franchise relocation); Wyckoff v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 705 F. App’x 26, 28 (2d Cir. 2017) (questioning the applicability of federal
antitrust law to MLB scouts).
107. See Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir. 2017).
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sional baseball players,” in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.108 Further, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants “entered into
a continuing agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade with the purpose, intent, and effect of restraining horizontal
competition among the Defendants and the MLB,” in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.109 The district court dismissed the
case.110 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Business of Baseball exemption and the language of the Flood
Act prohibited the minor leaguers from bringing federal antitrust
law claims.111
While the court refused to judge the case on its merits, the minor leaguers’ complaint still stated claims that would otherwise constitute antitrust violations.112 Their argument focused on the UPCs
that a minor league player must sign to play for an MLB
franchise.113 The players alleged that the MLB franchises used
these UPCs as a tool for “artificially and illegally depressing minor
league wages . . . below what they would receive in a competitive
market.”114 At the time of Miranda, the UPCs stated that first-year
players would receive $1,100 per month, only during the course of
the season, resulting in annual earnings of less than $10,000.115 The
players contended that minor leaguers would be able to earn higher
wages if MLB and its member franchises did not conspire to suppress minor leaguers’ wages and if the open market was able to
assess the value of their services.116 While the scope of the Flood
Act shows that Congress did not intend for minor leaguers to have
standing to bring a case under federal antitrust law,117 perhaps that
is the problem.

108. Complaint at 27–28, Miranda v. Selig, No. 14-cv-05349-HSG, 2015 WL
5357854 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Miranda Complaint].
109. Id. at 28–29.
110. Miranda v. Selig, No. 14-cv-05349-HSG, 2015 WL 5357854 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 14, 2015), aff’d, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017).
111. Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2017).
112. Miranda Complaint, supra note 108, at 26–29.
113. Id. at 15–20.
114. Id. at 17.
115. See Miranda, 860 F.3d at 1239.
116. Miranda Complaint, supra note 108, at 24–25.
117. See Miranda, 860 F.3d at 1243–44 (discussing Congress’s intent to exclude minor league baseball from antitrust law as an extension of the historical
Business of Baseball exemption); see also infra Part III.B.1.
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Other Determinations on the Scope and Impact of the Flood
Act

Courts have assessed the Business of Baseball exemption for
areas outside minor league baseball as well. The Flood Act states
that it does not extend the application of federal antitrust law to
“the relationship between persons in the business of organized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals who are employed in the business of organized professional baseball by such
persons.”118 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed this
subsection of the Flood Act when a group of professional baseball
scouts brought a class action suit against the Commissioner of
MLB.119 As a condition of employment by a MLB franchise, the
scouts had to sign Uniform Employee Contracts (“UECs”) provided by MLB.120 Much like the UPCs that minor leaguers sign,
the scouts’ UECs dictated their payment and other terms of their
employment.121 The scouts argued that these UECs were an unreasonable restraint on their employment and prevented the scouts
from obtaining a fair value for their services.122 Further, the plaintiffs argued that the court should not include scouts and their UECs
within the Business of Baseball after the Flood Act because the restriction “serves no essential function in staging professional baseball games nor does such anticompetitive conduct enhance the
vitality or viability of baseball.”123 In light of Supreme Court precedent, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ view of the Business
of Baseball exemption and the limited exception to the exemption
that the Flood Act created.124 The court construed the Flood Act
to apply to professional scouts, deciding that the scouts are “persons in the Business of Baseball.”125
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Minor League Players’ Need for Reform
The application of federal antitrust law to Minor League Baseball players is more than a hypothetical issue. Minor leaguers deal
118. Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(5) (2018).
119. Wyckoff v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 705 F. App’x 26, 28 (2d
Cir. 2017).
120. Second Amended Complaint at 20, 23, 27–28, Wyckoff v. Office of the
Comm’r of Baseball, No. 15-CV-05186-PGG, 211 F. Supp. 3d 615 (S.D.N.Y. Cal.
Sept. 29, 2016).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 26–29.
123. Id. at 25.
124. Wyckoff, 705 F. App’x at 29.
125. Id.
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with many issues due to the wage structure contained in the
league’s Uniform Player Contracts. Recently, MLB has responded
with attempts to remedy these issues, but protection under the antitrust laws would prevent MLB from changing its mind in the future.
1.

Wage Structure Under Minor League Baseball’s Uniform
Player Contracts

MLB’s annually-published Major League Rules (“MLR”) include a copy of the UPC that all minor leaguers must sign in order
to play for an MiLB team.126 The MLR also states that the salary a
minor leaguer receives “shall be the amount established by the Major Leagues for each Minor League classification or League.”127
The minimum salary for minor leaguers is $1,100 per month for all
first-year players.128 The minor league UPCs state that minor
leaguers and the team they play for “shall attempt annually to negotiate an applicable monthly salary rate for the next subsequent
championship playing season.”129 If the parties are unable to reach
an agreement about the pay rate, the club gets to set the salary,
provided the new pay rate is not less than 80 percent of what the
player made the previous season.130
Additionally, minor leaguers earn payment for their work only
during the regular season and the playoffs—not for their work during the off season or spring training.131 Based on these salary numbers, thousands of minor leaguers end up making less than $10,000
per year,132 falling below the federal poverty level.133 To make ends
meet, minor leaguers settle for low-quality living arrangements,
work minimum wage jobs during the off season, and cut costs wherever they can.134
126. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, MAJOR LEAGUE RULES 205–231 (2019).
127. Id. at 29.
128. Frequently Asked Questions: The Business of MiLB, MILB, https://
atmilb.com/2EGKeos [https://perma.cc/25PA-BK84] (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
129. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 126, at 209.
130. Id. at 210.
131. Id.
132. Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2017).
133. Federal Poverty Level (FPL), U.S. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://bit.ly/390wX8g [https://perma.cc/X8PA-DW38] (last visited
Dec. 20, 2019).
134. Emily Waldon, ‘I Can’t Afford to Play this Game’: Minor-Leaguers open
up about the Realities of Their Pay, and Its Impact on Their Lives, THE ATHLETIC
(Mar. 15, 2019), http://bit.ly/2rbuRBg [https://perma.cc/A3H7-AB2E] (detailing
the financial struggles of several anonymous minor leaguers and the effect that
their low salary has on their lives).
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Some minor leaguers are able to survive their stint in the minor
leagues by living off their signing bonuses.135 Top draft picks receive signing bonuses over $1 million.136 Approximately 40 percent
of players receive signing bonuses of less than $10,000.137 Without
a signing bonus acting as a nest egg, minor leaguers drafted in later
rounds are even more dependent on off-season jobs to make ends
meet.
2.

Length and Viability of a Minor League Baseball Career

A career in professional baseball does not guarantee financial
success.138 The annual MLB draft lasts 40 rounds, with each team
receiving the rights to one player in each round, with a few exceptions.139 MLB rosters allow for only 25 active players.140 These
numbers mean that, at any given time, there are 750 MLB players,
while 1,200 new players enter the draft each year.141 It takes players drafted in the first two rounds of the MLB draft an average of
four to six years to make it to the major leagues.142 Players taken in
later rounds wait even longer in the minor leagues and are much
135. Generally, MLB draft picks bargain for and receive signing bonuses in
addition to the salaries in the UPCs that they sign. Jim Callis, Here are the 2019
Draft Pools and Bonus Values, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (June 3, 2019), https://
atmlb.com/2HX1kQy. MLB teams each have a limited pool from which they can
draw signing bonus money. Id. MLB determines the value of each team’s bonus
pool based on the position of each team’s draft picks in the first ten rounds of the
draft. Id. MLB limits the signing bonuses for players drafted in rounds 11–40 to
$125,000 per player, unless a team decides to spend from its pool. Id. The average
bonus pool in 2019 was $8.8 million per team. Id. Bonus pools increase annually
in line with annual increases in MLB’s revenue. Id. See Weaver, infra note 136 for
more information on the ranges and averages of MLB draft pick signing bonuses.
136. Levi Weaver, On Minor-League Pay, MLB’s Stance Doesn’t Line up with
the Facts, THE ATHLETIC (Apr. 4, 2018), http://bit.ly/2NZA0ot [https://perma.cc/
H6YX-7M5J] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
137. Id.
138. But see Josh Norris, Lobbying Effort By MLB, MiLB Could Pay Off
(Mar. 21, 2018), BASEBALL AMERICA, http://bit.ly/37tloFx [https://perma.cc/R69JCDM8] (containing an interview with MiLB President Pat O’Connor about the
state of pay for minor leaguers and their opportunities).
139. 2019 Draft Tracker, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, https://atmlb.com/
3aMdyZM (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (detailing the order and number of draft
picks in the 2019 MLB draft); Jonathan Mayo, Examining Impact of Houston’s
Lost Draft Picks, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (Jan. 13, 2020) https://atmlb.com/
37sLwAi (discussing the Houston Astros losing multiple future draft picks as a
punishment for stealing signs during the 2017 regular season and playoffs).
140. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 126, at 6.
141. Id.
142. Cork Gaines, Most Baseball Draft Picks Will Still Be In The Minors Four
Years From Now, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 7. 2013) http://bit.ly/3aIohUV [https://
perma.cc/27XG-3J87].
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less likely to make it to the majors.143 The average MLB career
lasts 6.85 years.144 The terms of the UPCs and MLB’s free agency
system allow a single franchise to control a player for up to 12
years.145 Given the average length of time players spend in the minor and major leagues, the average player will never have an opportunity to sell his skills on the open market.146
Despite low wages in the minor leagues with little chance of
progressing to the majors, not everyone in professional baseball
agrees that the players are put in an unfair financial situation. In an
interview about the topic of minor league player wages, MiLB President Pat O’Connor defended the league’s payment structure.147
O’Connor justified the low wages on the basis of upward mobility
as follows:
This is not a career choice, and people want to debate about the
fact that McDonald’s worker[s] make more than minor league
baseball players, and that’s a fact. But I don’t think that somewhere there’s a major league in French fry prep that makes
$550,000 [as its] minimum wage or starting wage.148

O’Connor also offered a grim look on how increasing wages
for minor leaguers would affect MiLB.149 O’Connor said, if minor
league salaries hypothetically were to double or triple, it would lead
143. MLB Amateur Entry Draft, THE BASEBALL CUBE, http://bit.ly/2RQp65l
[https://perma.cc/A5SP-TALK] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (illustrating the lack of
players drafted in late rounds). As an example, only 3 of the 150 players drafted in
the final 5 rounds of the 2015 draft have made it to the MLB for any amount of
time. Id. Compare this to the 50 percent of players from the first 2 rounds who, on
average, would have made it to the MLB in this time. Id.
144. Sam Roberts, Just How Long Does the Average Baseball Career Last?,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 15, 2007) https://nyti.ms/37uRHE6 [https://perma.cc/
YKJ3-D3BN] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (listing the average career length of players drafted from 1969–1993). Players drafted after 1993 were not included in the
data because not all of their careers have yet ended. Id.
145. Weaver, supra note 136. A minor leaguer can become a free agent after
playing for seven seasons in the minor league system of an MLB franchise. Id. If
an MLB franchise adds a minor leaguer to the team’s major league roster, the
franchise would control the player’s right at the major league level for another six
years. Id. Between the years of minor league control and the years of major
league control, a minor leaguer could spend 12 total years before becoming a free
agent and having the opportunity to earn market value for his services. Id.
146. Id.
147. Whitney McIntosh, The President of Minor League Baseball has Some
Thoughts About Paying Players a Fair Wage, SB NATION (Dec. 19, 2017) http://
bit.ly/2TXdb8o [https://perma.cc/GP24-4U7M].
148. Id.
149. Weaver, supra note 136.
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to MLB reducing the number of MiLB franchises accordingly.150
That statement is far from solely fear mongering, as MLB is already
proposing a reduction in the size of MiLB.151 Increasing the average minor leaguer’s salary to $40,000 annually would cost each
MLB franchise $6.815 million.152 For comparison, the average
MLB payroll in 2019 was $138.6 million.153 Therefore, an increase
of $6.815 million would raise the average MLB payroll by less than
5 percent.154 Additionally, MLB set a league record for revenue in
2019, grossing over $10.7 billion.155 Despite these statistics, MLB is
only beginning to make changes.
3.

Major League Baseball’s Steps to Remedy the Problem

MLB and some of its member franchises are taking steps to
address the issues surrounding minor league pay.156 Before the
2019 season, one MLB franchise, the Toronto Blue Jays, announced
plans to increase minor league salaries within its system by 50 percent.157 The Major League Baseball Player’s Association
(“MLBPA”) praised the raise, but MLB merely addressed future
negotiations with MiLB.158 MLB stated that salaries would be a
focal point in discussions about the new Professional Baseball
Agreement (“PBA”) between MLB and MiLB.159 The current
PBA expires at the end of the 2020 regular season.160
150. Id. (“If the cost of that talent is doubled or tripled, . . . MLB is not going
to pay that much money for the talent. . . They’re going to say, ‘If 160 teams is
going to cost [this much], we’re just going to cut down on the number of teams.’”).
151. J.J. Cooper, MLB Proposal Would Eliminate 42 Minor League Teams,
BASEBALL AMERICA (Oct. 18, 2019), http://bit.ly/30Sl7cJ [https://perma.cc/JWD6N4YE] (detailing a proposed plan by MLB ahead of negotiations in 2020 between
MLB and MiLB on an updated Professional Baseball Agreement between the two
organizations).
152. Weaver, supra note 136.
153. MLB Team Payroll Tracker, SPOTRAC, http://bit.ly/37nj9U5 [https://
perma.cc/PJG5-RDTJ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (showing the total payroll for
each MLB franchise during the 2019 season, as well as the league average).
154. Weaver, supra note 136.
155. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion In Revenues For 2019,
FORBES (Dec. 21, 2019), http://bit.ly/36rQsUK (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
156. Supra notes 136–145 and accompanying text.
157. John Delcos, Toronto Blue Jays Boost Pay of Their Minor Leaguers; Major League Baseball Not Thrilled (Mar. 18, 2019), FORBES, http://bit.ly/2TS1YGm.
158. Id.
159. Jeff Passan, Sources: MLB Eyes Higher Salaries in Minors, ESPN (Mar.
18, 2019), https://es.pn/30RfyLF (“The working conditions of minor league players,
including their compensation, facilities and benefits, is an important area of discussion in those negotiations.”).
160. Delcos, supra note 157.
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More recently, MLB announced a plan to reduce the number
of minor league teams affiliated with the MLB.161 The plan would
focus on eliminating minor league teams with inadequate facilities.162 The plan would also lead to a restructuring of the multitiered system of MiLB.163 Currently a minor leaguer’s minimum
salary is determined in part by the tier the player occupies.164 Additionally, the plan would reduce the number of rounds in the MLB
Amateur Draft to 20–25 rounds.165 While this plan is still in its infancy and there will be extensive negotiations between MLB and
MiLB, these proposed changes may impact the PBA and the current state of minor league baseball.
B.

Antitrust Analysis

Several steps are important when analyzing the legality of
MLB’s treatment of minor leaguers under federal antitrust law.
The first important step is to analyze the current scope of the Business of Baseball exemption and the changes that Congress would
need to make to allow minor leaguers to bring suit against MLB.166
The next step is to examine the collective bargaining process that
led to the current state of minor leaguers and the potential that
collectively bargained contracts preempt application of federal antitrust law in this case.167 The third and final step is to select and
apply the proper standard of review under federal antitrust law.168
The conclusion from this analysis is that the current treatment of
minor leaguers is a violation of federal antitrust law without the
Business of Baseball exemption.
1.

Current Scope of the Business of Baseball Exemption

The Flood Act has eliminated only portions of the Business of
Baseball exemption.169 While the Flood Act brought the employment of major league baseball players under the control of federal
antitrust law, it also explicitly left other areas of the Business of
161. Cooper, supra note 151.
162. Id.
163. Id.; MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 126, at 229–230; Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 128 (explaining the tiered structure of minor league
baseball. Tiers range from rookie league to AAA, with the experience, skill, and
compensation of players increasing at each level).
164. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 126, at 229–230; Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 128.
165. Cooper, supra note 151.
166. Infra Part III.B.1.
167. Infra Part III.B.2.
168. Infra Part III.B.3.
169. Supra Part II.C.
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Baseball exemption intact.170 The Flood Act did not subject the
employment of minor leaguers to federal antitrust law.171 Instead,
the remaining Business of Baseball exemption prevents minor
leaguers from bringing suit against MLB for potential violations of
federal antitrust law.172
Courts have heard cases about several areas of the Business of
Baseball since Congress passed the Flood Act,173 and the employment of minor leaguers was the subject of one of those cases.174
Generally, courts have followed the stance of the Supreme Court in
regard to the Business of Baseball exemption.175 In fact, courts
have held that Congress specifically expressed its intent not to subject the employment of minor leaguers to antitrust law by excluding
them from the Flood Act.176 The exclusion makes courts even
more hesitant to apply antitrust law to the employment of minor
leaguers.177 If the Business of Baseball exemption is going to
change further, Congress likely will have to be the source of that
change.178
Considering the financial hardships minor leaguers face,179 minor leaguers are justified in taking steps to improve their situations.
Antitrust law exists to protect competition.180 MLB’s vertical integration with MiLB and its use of UPCs to dictate the wages of minor leaguers is arguably anticompetitive by nature.181 Minor
leaguers believe that they would earn higher salaries in a truly competitive market for their services.182 Congress should amend the
Flood Act or pass new legislation to subject the employment of minor leaguers to federal antitrust law.
If Congress were to pass that legislation, players like the plaintiffs in Miranda v. Selig would be able to have a court hear the
merits of their case.183 The proposed legislation would not guarantee that a court would find MLB to be in violation of federal anti170. Supra Part II.C.1.
171. Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b) (2018).
172. Id.
173. Supra Part II.C.2.
174. See Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir. 2017).
175. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258. 284 (1972) (holding that Congress, not the
Supreme Court or the judicial branch generally, is the proper entity to alter the
Business of Baseball exemption).
176. See, e.g., Miranda, 860 F.3d at 1239–40.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Supra Part III.A.
180. Supra Part II.A.
181. See, e.g., Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237.
182. Miranda Complaint, supra note 108, at 26–29.
183. Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237, 1240.
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trust law. Any court would still have to analyze these facts using
the steps that would apply to any other antitrust case.184 Nonetheless, the proposed legislation at least would give minor leaguers the
opportunity to be heard and give courts the chance to decide if
MLB’s actions are truly anticompetitive. The following parts of this
Comment will analyze the applicability of federal antitrust law to
the current employment of minor leaguers in the event that Congress were to pass legislation allowing courts to do such analysis.
2.

The Non-Statutory Labor Union Exemption’s Applicability to
Minor League Baseball

The Clayton Act allows labor unions to enter into contracts
that might otherwise be in violation of federal antitrust law.185 For
these contracts to be valid, the agreement must serve a legitimate
goal of the union.186 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals created a
three-part test in Mackey v. National Football League (“Mackey
test”) to determine if a collective bargaining agreement preempts
federal antitrust law.187 This test is useful because the MLR and
the UPCs contained therein were drafted through collective bargaining between the MLBPA and MLB.188 Therefore, the Mackey
test can help determine if the MLR can preempt federal antitrust
law.
The MLR immediately fails the first element of the Mackey
test. The Mackey test requires that “the restraint on trade [in the
agreement] primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.”189 While the majority of the MLR deals with
the relationship between MLB and MLBPA members, it also heavily affects minor leaguers.190 Minor leaguers are not members of
the MLBPA.191 Further, while the MLBPA factors the impact on
minor leaguers into their decision making process, the MLBPA
does not represent minor leaguers in any legal capacity.192 Since
184. Infra Parts III.B.2. and III.B.3.
185. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2018).
186. See, e.g., Int’l Org., United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal &
Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839, 843–44 (4th Cir. 1927).
187. Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (creating a three-element test for the non-statutory exemption that allows labor law to
preempt antitrust law).
188. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 126, at 1.
189. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
190. See, eg., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 126, at 205–231.
191. Delcos, supra note 157.
192. Id. (quoting MLBPA director, Tony Clark, as saying, “Although we don’t
represent legally the minor league group, we will continue to do the things that we
can do to support them moving forward despite that”).
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the MLR fails the Mackey Test, a court would find that the MLR
and the UPCs therein do not preempt federal antitrust law.
3.

Proper Antitrust Test for Judging Minor League Baseball’s
Conduct

Antitrust law has multiple applicable court tests; the courts
choose which test to use based on the nature of the violation and
the facts at hand.193 The standard of review in each antitrust case
can impact the outcome before the trial begins.194 Attorneys filing
antitrust claims on behalf of minor leaguers must analyze what the
appropriate standard of review would be if federal antitrust law
were applicable to Minor League Baseball players.
a.

Per Se Illegal Violations

Under the Sherman Act, certain economic restraints are held
to be per se illegal.195 Per se violations of the Sherman Act fall into
specific categories.196 Only specifically harmful actions are classified as per se violations.197 If a court finds that a business committed a per se violation, the court will not consider the business’s
market power or intent before finding the business guilty of violating the Sherman Act.198
The treatment of minor leaguers through the MLR likely does
not fall into any of the per se illegal categories. Therefore, if minor
leaguers brought a suit against MLB, the court would have to use a
different standard of review.
193. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 52, at 144 (explaining that certain combinations should be condemned out of hand while others may have a positive economic impact).
194. Id. (explaining that the test used in a given case can shift the burden of
proof between parties).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
196. See, e.g., id. (condemning price-fixing as per se illegal); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612–13 (1914) (condemning concerted refusals to deal as per se illegal); Fashion Originators’ Guild,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467–68 (1941) (condemning certain group boycotts as
per se illegal).
197. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998) (“Yet certain kinds of
agreements will so often prove so harmful to competition and so rarely prove justified that the antitrust laws do not require proof that an agreement of that kind is,
in fact, anticompetitive in the particular circumstances. An agreement of such a
kind is unlawful per se.”).
198. Id. at 136.
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Quick Look Rule of Reason

In some antitrust cases, courts use an abbreviated or “quick
look” rule of reason test.199 The quick look rule of reason is an
appropriate standard of review where an agreement is not so blatantly anticompetitive as to justify a finding of per se illegality.200
The quick look rule of reason does not require in-depth market
analysis but rather a less formal assessment of the anticompetitive
nature of an agreement.201
The quick look rule of reason is not the proper test for the
employment of minor league baseball players. While there is not a
hard line rule delineating when to use the quick look rule of reason,
the employment of minor leaguers is not a good fit for the rule.202
The reduced emphasis on market analysis is not fitting when analyzing a practice that has been occurring since the start of the relationship between MLB and MiLB.203 Therefore, if minor leaguers
brought a suit against MLB, the court would have to turn to the
final prominent test for violations of federal antitrust law: the rule
of reason.
c.

Rule of Reason

Courts have used the rule of reason to test for violations of
federal antitrust law since the early days of the Sherman Act.204
Unlike the quick look version, the full rule of reason involves indepth market analysis to determine the anticompetitive impact of
an agreement or practice.205 When a court analyzes an antitrust
claim under the rule of reason, trials are notoriously in-depth and
drawn out.206 While most antitrust suits end in a settlement,207 the
199. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770–73 (1999).
200. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(“While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.”).
201. Id.
202. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
203. Id. (explaining that market clarity and experience is an important factor
in assessing if a quick look is sufficient to find a violation of federal antitrust law).
204. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
205. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[T]he finder of fact must
decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information
about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”).
206. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 365, 374–81 (1970) (describing the length and in-depth nature of federal
antitrust suits and analyzing length for suits brought by the government and by
private parties).
207. Id. at 381.
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amount of market data and level of analysis used is too unwieldy
and unavailable for the purposes of this Comment. Therefore, it is
impossible to make an accurate analysis—let alone a good faith hypothesis—about whether a court would find a violation of federal
antitrust law in the current employment of minor leaguers.208
The more important outcome of this Comment is the path to
allow the courts to do the analysis. Congress should pass legislation
or amend the Flood Act so courts can hear claims like Miranda v.
Selig and assess the merits of the plaintiffs’ antitrust violation
claims.209 The rule of reason is the proper test for claims like those
in Miranda v. Selig.210 While courts may decide that MLB’s actions
do not constitute a violation of federal antitrust law, minor leaguers
deserve the opportunity to have their cases heard.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Professional baseball has long enjoyed an exemption from federal antitrust law.211 Congress addressed the issue of the exemption
by passing the Flood Act and subjecting the employment of MLB
players to antitrust law.212 However, antitrust law still does not apply to the employment of minor leaguers.213 The antitrust exemption and use of UPCs artificially suppresses minor leaguers’ wages
below their market value.214 Minor leaguers are forced to choose
among playing the game they love for below-poverty-level salaries,
taking on second or even third jobs while playing as professionals,
or quitting the game to continue to support themselves and their
families.215
208. See Gregg Steinman, Note, Social Injustice in Minor League Baseball:
How Major League Baseball Makes Use of an Antitrust Exemption to Exploit Its
Employees, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 139 (2015), for further discussion on how courts would rule on a suit analyzing the potential antitrust violations
that have been considered by this Comment.
209. But see Stanley M. Brand & Andrew J. Giorgione, The Effect of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption and Contraction on its Minor League Baseball System: A
Case Study of the Harrisburg Senators, 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 49, 51–52
(2003) (“Even if Minor League Baseball were to prevail on an antitrust claim, the
litigation costs of defending such a charge would threaten the league’s survival. In
the end, minor league player development would be stripped of its stability created
by the player draft, reserve clause, and the PBA.”).
210. Supra Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2.
211. Supra Part II.B.
212. Supra Part II.C.1.
213. Supra Part II.C.1.
214. See Miranda Complaint, supra note 108 at 2, 22.
215. Supra Part III.A.
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The courts have repeatedly held that altering the Business of
Baseball antitrust exemption is a job for Congress.216 For that reason, in order to prevent further economic harm to minor leaguers,
Congress should pass legislation similar to the Flood Act that subjects the employment of minor leaguers to federal antitrust law and
allows minor leaguers to bring claims of antitrust violations against
MLB.217
Furthermore, with this proposition, minor leaguers’ claims
would not be barred under the Labor Union exemption to federal
antitrust law.218 Minor leaguers are not members of the union that
bargained for the terms of the UPCs at issue.219 Therefore, these
claims fail the Mackey Test, due to the lack of a collective bargaining relationship between minor leaguers and MLB.220 Since MLB
cannot satisfy the Mackey Test, courts should not apply the Labor
Union exemption.221
Courts should analyze minor leaguers’ claims under the Rule
of Reason.222 The analysis would involve a thorough analysis of the
baseball market and a look at the anticompetitive harms and
procompetitive benefits of UPCs.223 While it is uncertain whether
courts would find that MLB and its UPCs violate antitrust law, minor leaguers at least would have their voices heard and could assure
that MLB does not act in an unfair manner.224 The proposed alteration to the Business of Baseball antitrust exemption would be
nothing short of a home run.
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